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Introduction 
By Brett G. Scharffs.∗
It is my pleasure to welcome you to the American Association of 
Law Schools’ 2004 Law and Religion Section Meeting and to thank 
our distinguished panel for being with us to address the topic, “One 
Nation Under God? Unity, Diversity, and Neutrality Under the 
Religion Clauses.” We meet in interesting times, when questions 
about the proper place of religion in public life and public support 
for religious life are matters of deep and spirited national concern. 
The questions we address today are not esoteric matters of interest 
only to specialists, although our panelists bring a depth, care, and 
subtlety of thinking to these issues that is often lacking from the 
heated political and journalistic discourse that has been notable 
mostly for its volume, in the many senses of that word. 
When the Ninth Circuit held in Newdow v. United States 
Congress.1 that California’s policy of requiring the recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance in public school classrooms was an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion due to the Pledge’s 
inclusion of the words “under God,”2 the political reaction was swift 
and negative. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle condemned the 
ruling as “ridiculous,” “nuts,” and “stupid,”3 and, in response, both 
houses of Congress passed resolutions by overwhelming margins in 
∗ Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; B.S.B.A., 
M.A., Georgetown University; B.Phil, Oxford University; J.D., Yale Law School. I would like 
to thank Tom Berg, Fred Gedicks, Steve Gey, and Frank Ravitch for their thoughtful and 
provocative contributions to the Law and Religion Section Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, on 
January 3, 2004. I would also like to thank the editors of the BYU Law Review for publishing 
these proceedings. Professor Thomas C. Berg’s presentation was based in large part upon his 
article, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41 (2003), 
which is not reproduced here. 
 1. 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub 
nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 607–12. 
 3. Steven G. Gey, “Under God,” the Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitutional 
Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865, 1866 (2003) (citations omitted) (quoting the statements of 
President Bush, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, and Senator Byrd). For a summary of 
the political firestorm, see id. at 1866–68 & nn.2–5. 
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support of the Pledge.4 Upon reflection, however, many 
commentators weighed in with the view that the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis represented a faithful application of what can only be 
described as the Supreme Court’s confusing and chaotic doctrine 
governing this area of the law.5 When the case went before the 
Supreme Court, dozens of amici lined up on each side of the issue.6 
(Since the Section meeting in January 2004, the Supreme Court held 
that Michael Newdow, as a noncustodial parent, did not have 
standing in the case.7 The immediate effect of this holding was a 
reversal of the Ninth Circuit, but the outcome was widely viewed as 
a postponement of the Pledge issue.)8
While the Pledge case set off political shock waves, it was not the 
only recent case involving religion in public life to touch raw nerves. 
In the twelve months since last we met, the case reporters and 
headlines have been filled with controversies involving the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Even a brief and 
partial recitation of the issues and cases during the year 2003 makes 
clear that a deep and wide division exists in our country on matters 
involving public support of religion, the proper relationship of 
church and state, and the acceptable limits of religious expression in 
the public square. 
 
 
 4. See id. at 1867–68 nn.6–7. 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 1870, 1880–84; Linda P. McKenzie, The Pledge of Allegiance: One 
Nation Under God?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 379 (2004). McKenzie describes the confusion of 
Supreme Court Establishment Clause doctrines: 
The current Pledge of Allegiance predicament is the direct result of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s failure to provide adequate direction to the lower courts for 
determining whether a challenged government action violates the Establishment 
Clause. In fact, the Court itself has applied no less than three different tests to such 
challenges. The choice of which test to apply is further complicated by the fact that 
the Court continues to develop new tests without specifically overruling any of its 
prior Establishment Clause doctrines. 
Id. at 383–84 (footnotes omitted). 
 6. See Brett G. Scharffs, Is the Pledge of Allegiance an Unconstitutional Establishment of 
Religion?, PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS., Mar. 15, 2004, at 304, 310–11 (listing amici). 
 7. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2310–11 (2004). 
 8. See, e.g., Joyce Howard Price, Justices Refuse to Reopen Pledge Case, WASH. TIMES, 
Aug. 24, 2004, at A07 (commenting that people both for and against the constitutionality of 
the Pledge as it exists were disappointed that the Supreme Court struck down the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling “on a technicality,” leaving open the opportunity for other parents to pursue a 
similar case in the future). 
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For example: 
• In Alabama, attorneys sued Chief Justice Roy Moore of the 
Alabama Supreme Court, alleging that he violated the 
Establishment Clause by placing a large stone monument 
engraved with the Ten Commandments in the Alabama State 
Judicial Building. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld a federal district court judge’s conclusion that the 
display violated the Establishment Clause.9 A showdown over 
the rule of law ensued when Chief Justice Moore refused to 
remove the display, and an Alabama judicial ethics panel 
eventually removed him from office.10 Demonstrators, 
including one dressed as Moses carrying cardboard tablets, 
protested outside the state court building in support of 
Moore,11 but the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in the case.12 
• In contrast, a Kentucky federal district court, the Fifth 
Circuit in a Texas case, and the Third Circuit in a 
Pennsylvania case each held that the display of the Ten 
Commandments in public buildings does not violate the 
Establishment Clause.13 
 9. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Moore v. 
Glassroth, 124 S. Ct. 497 (2003). In a related case, McGinley v. Houston, 282 F. Supp. 2d 
1304 (M.D. Ala. 2003), a federal district court held that the associate justices of the Alabama 
Supreme Court did not violate the Establishment Clause and unconstitutionally establish a 
religion of “nontheistic beliefs” by removing the monument depicting the Ten 
Commandments from the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building in order to comply 
with a federal court injunction. For a discussion of the factual and legal issues in the Alabama 
Ten Commandments case, see Gabriël A. Moens, The Menace of Neutrality in Religion, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 535. 
 10. See Alabama Chief Justice Removed from Office, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ 
LAW/11/13/moore.tencommandments/index.html (Nov. 14, 2003). 
 11. See Supreme Court Rejects Ten Commandments Monument Appeal: Decision Lets 
Stand Alabama Decision to Remove Statue, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/03/ 
scotus.tencommandments.ap/index.html (Nov. 3, 2003). 
 12. Moore v. Glassroth, 124 S. Ct. 497 (2003). 
 13. See Freethought Soc’y of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 
2003) (reversing a district court holding that an eighty-two-year-old Ten Commandments 
plaque displayed on the façade of a county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause); Van 
Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 2004 LEXIS 6691 (Oct. 12, 
2004) (holding that a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol 
does not violate the First Amendment); ACLU v. Mercer County, 240 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. 
Ky. 2003) (holding that the display of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse does 
not violate the Establishment Clause).  
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• Other federal courts did find Establishment Clause violations 
in cases involving displays of the Ten Commandments in 
public places. In a case from Wisconsin,14 the city of La 
Crosse sold a small parcel of land containing a display of the 
Ten Commandments to a fraternal organization, built a fence 
around the monument, and posted a sign disclaiming 
endorsement of a religious message. Nevertheless, a federal 
district court judge held that the city had violated the 
Establishment Clause and compelled the resale of the land to 
the city and the removal of the monument.15 
• Controversy also erupted when the National Park Service 
included in its Grand Canyon bookstore a book defending 
the creationist view that the Grand Canyon was formed as a 
result of the great flood described in the book of Genesis and 
is thus only a few thousand years old.16 Critics complained 
that “the book is the latest example that the National Park 
Service has caved to pressure from conservative and 
fundamentalist Christian groups, accommodating their 
requests to post or alter materials.”17 This controversy came 
on the heels of the National Park Service’s removing (after 
receiving complaints from civil libertarians) and then 
returning (while officials took a second look at the issue) 
public displays quoting the Bible, which a religious group 
placed at scenic overlooks of the South Rim of the Grand 
Canyon over thirty years ago.18 In that instance, the issue was 
turned over to the Justice Department to determine whether 
 14. Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 276 F. Supp. 2d 961 (W.D. Wis. 2003). 
 15. Id.; see also ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. 
granted, 2004 LEXIS 6693 (Oct. 12, 2004) (concluding that predominant purpose of Ten 
Commandments displays in county schools and courthouses was religious); Chambers v. City 
of Frederick, 292 F. Supp. 2d 766 (D. Md. 2003) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss a 
suit against a city, mayor, and fraternal organization, alleging the violation of the 
Establishment Clause when the city sold to the fraternal organization a city park that contained 
a monument of the Ten Commandments). 
 16. See Issue of Religious Displays Before National Park Service, at http://www. 
cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/07/religious.displays.ap (Jan. 7, 2004). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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the plaques should be taken down permanently or remain at 
the park.19 
• In Locke v. Davey,20 the Supreme Court upheld, against a 
Free Exercise challenge, a Washington State scholarship 
program that excluded divinity students from eligibility.21 
• In Florida, a church successfully challenged a county’s refusal 
to permit it to display an overtly religious display at the 
county’s holiday festival. The court did order, however, that 
the display be modified to explicitly indicate that the message 
was from the church, not the county.22 
• Additionally, cases were decided holding that a Christian 
prayer offered by a school board member at a high school 
graduation ceremony was private speech, not state-sponsored 
speech,23 that a suppertime prayer given by the college 
superintendent at a state-operated military college violated 
the Establishment Clause by coercing religious worship,24 
and that a county board policy of inviting only 
representatives of the Judeo-Christian tradition to offer 
invocations at public sessions violated the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise rights of plaintiff, a Wiccan 
religion practitioner.25 
• Concerned with the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Summum v. 
City of Ogden26 that a city cannot display the Ten 
Commandments while declining to display other monuments 
that espouse differing religious or political views, a city 
 19. See Religious Displays Spur Debate in Nation’s Parks, at http://edition. 
cnn.com/2004/TRAVEL/01/07/religious.displays.ap (Jan. 7, 2004). 
 20. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). 
 21. Id. at 1315. 
 22. Calvary Chapel Church, Inc. v. Broward County, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (S.D. Fla. 
2003). 
 23. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist., 340 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 2003). Under the 
circumstances in Doe, and given the board member’s status as a parent, the school district was 
not held liable since the board member gave the prayer on his own initiative and not as part of 
a school policy or custom. Id. 
 24. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 25. Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 292 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 
2003). 
 26. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002). 
2SCH-FIN 10/13/2004 9:55 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2004 
990 
 
council in Wyoming grappled with the issue of keeping a Ten 
Commandments monument on display in its city park.27 The 
city council was uneasy because a Baptist minister had asked 
to place a monument in the park with an inscription 
amounting to “hate speech.”28 To avoid the possible 
consequences of creating a free speech forum by keeping the 
Ten Commandments monument on city-owned property, 
the city considered selling a small chunk of the city park to a 
private party so that the monument could stay where it was.29 
• The Utah Supreme Court decided a case involving a 
constitutional challenge to a city’s refusal to allow the 
plaintiff to offer a prayer during the opening ceremony of a 
city council meeting.30 The city claimed that it rejected the 
proposed prayer because it did not fall within the subject-
matter restriction that the city had placed on the opening 
ceremony, not because the city disagreed with the plaintiff.’s 
religious beliefs.31 The court held that the city’s means of 
 27. See Brendan Burke, Ten Commandments Issue Divides Casper City Council, at 
http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2003/10/01/news/casper/3c81eea836ea342d0a
c0d6e0cc0a4e06.txt (Oct. 1, 2003). 
 28. See Michelle Dynes, Monument May Get New Home: Phelps’ Threat Spurs Mayor’s 
Plan to Relocate Ten Commandments, WYO. TRIB.-EAGLE, Nov. 8, 2003, at A1. Reverend Fred 
Phelps of the Topeka-based Westboro Baptist Church proposed placing a memorial to the 
homosexual University of Wyoming student killed in 1998, with the following inscription: 
“Matthew Shepard Entered Hell Oct. 12, 1998 at age 21 In Defiance of God’s Warning: 
‘Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind; it is an abomination’ Leviticus 18:22.” 
Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, 73 P.3d 325 (Utah 2003). A related 
case, Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998), had previously gone all 
the way to the Tenth Circuit. 
 31. Snyder, 2003 UT 13 ¶ 29, 73 P.3d at 331. A portion of the text of Snyder’s 
proposed opening prayer is as follows: 
OUR MOTHER, who art in heaven (if, indeed there is a heaven and if there is a 
god that takes a woman’s form) hallowed be thy name, we ask for thy blessing for 
and guidance of those that will participate in this meeting and for those mortals that 
govern the state of Utah; 
We fervently ask that you guide the leaders of this city, Salt Lake County and the 
state of Utah so that they may see the wisdom of separating church and state and so 
that they will never again perform demeaning religious ceremonies as part of official 
government functions; 
We pray that you prevent self-righteous politicians from mis-using the name of God 
in conducting government meetings; and that you lead them away from the 
hypocritical and blasphemous deception of the public, attempting to make the 
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selecting those entitled to offer the prayer at the opening of 
its city council meetings was discriminatory and not neutral; 
therefore, the city’s practice constituted a direct benefit to 
the exercise of religion in violation of the Utah 
Constitution.32 
In a society that is increasingly diverse, and in which the nature 
of religious allegiances is very different than it was even a generation 
ago, this Section meeting was designed to focus a critical eye on the 
continuing adequacy of some of the key doctrinal concepts in Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including 
neutrality, hostility, coercion, separation, and endorsement. 
In his presentation, Tom Berg argues that the strongest rationale 
for the constitutionality of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge is 
that the phrase reinforces the idea that our nation’s government is an 
institution of limited power and must recognize inalienable rights 
that transcend any human authority.33 Historically—from the 
founding of the Republic, to the abolitionist arguments against 
slavery, to the civil rights movement—religious viewpoints have been 
important to policy debates, and the Establishment Clause allows the 
state to rely on religious rationales for political assertions. Thus, the 
phrase “under God” may be viewed as a permissible statement of a 
rationale for human rights and limited government. Professor Berg 
also argues that removing “under God” from the Pledge would not 
further neutrality, since omitting—or worse, eliminating—an 
affirmation is not neutral. Rather, it is an assertion that the state 
recognizes no authority above itself. While some may find it difficult 
to pledge allegiance to the idea that we are a nation “under God,” 
others would find it difficult to pledge allegiance to a state that 
recognizes no limits on its power. Thus, while including “under 
God” may represent a burden to atheists, excluding “under God” 
would burden religious believers. 
Fred Gedicks identifies what he calls a “constitutional gag 
reflex,” or the “instinctive intellectual revulsion one might feel in 
people believe that bureaucrat’s decisions and actions have thy stamp of approval if 
prayers are offered at the beginning of government meetings . . . . 
Snyder, 2003 UT 13 ¶ 5 n.1, 73 P.3d at 327 n.1. 
 32. Id. ¶ 30, 73 P.3d at 331–32. 
 33. Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 41 (2003). 
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response to the doctrine or holding of a case.”34 Professor Gedicks 
argues that over the last twenty years, the central question of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted from a concern with 
the meaning of “separation” of church and state to a concern with 
“treating religion neutrally or equally with respect to secular 
activities.”35 The problem with neutrality, Professor Gedicks argues, 
is that, taken to its logical extreme, neutrality could justify outcomes 
that would trigger an Establishment Clause gag reflex, and he 
provides a series of illustrative examples.36
Steven Gey suggests that while the Supreme Court has talked 
about neutrality in Establishment Clause cases, its deeper concern is 
with unity.37 Professor Gey argues that only a truly secular 
government can lead to stable civic unity. Religion, by its very 
nature, is exclusionary, and thus religion is not a promising basis for 
creating political unity. Professor Gey urges that the Court should 
recognize that political unity in the United States means unity 
among people whose views of the ultimate good are different. While 
religion is sometimes viewed as a unifier of the American people, 
religion and religious differences create deep conflicts as well. 
Professor Gey concludes that “[p]roponents of a religious form of 
national unity are fooling themselves. If we ever achieve unity 
through religion it will be a false unity, a unity of coercion and 
intolerance and mandatory obeisance to the God representing 
influential and politically dominant religious groups.”38
Frank Ravitch offers a searing critique of the way the Supreme 
Court has used the concepts of “neutrality” and “hostility” in its 
recent jurisprudence.39 Professor Ravitch argues that the concept of 
neutrality is problematic because, at least in the Establishment Clause 
context, neutrality does not and cannot exist. In contrast, hostility 
towards religion can exist, but “the fact that hostility can exist does 
not mean that the Court’s use of the concept is accurate.”40 
 34. Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Establishment Clause Gag Reflex, 2004 BYU L. REV. 
995, 996. 
 35. Id. at 999. 
 36. Id. at 1000–04. 
 37. Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional Secularism, 
2004 BYU L. REV. 1005, 1005–06. 
 38. Id. at 1029. 
 39. Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility: What Is “Hostile” to 
Religion Under the Establishment Clause?, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1031. 
 40. Id. at 1034–35. 
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Professor Ravitch maintains that when the Court employs the term 
“hostility” it presumes that the lack of formal neutrality is hostile to 
religion, and he argues that “this is not an adequate or accurate 
definition of ‘hostility.’”41
The panel’s viewpoints and arguments are indicative of the 
deeply perplexing and difficult issues that arise in this area of the law. 
While the panelists’ views do not reflect a convergence of opinion, 
they do reflect a high degree of respect for, and an attitude of 
seriousness towards, conflicting points of view. In an area where 
emotions tend to run high, this is itself an accomplishment worth 
praising. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41. Id. at 1047. 
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